Auf die verzweifelten, oft hysterischen Bitten der kommunistischen Machthaber Rußlands lieh der "kapitalistische Erzfeind", die Vereinigten Staaten, den Russen Gold.
- Stalin hatte die Vereinigten Staaten oder Great Britain nie weder verzweifelt noch hysterisch um etwas gebeten.
- In 1941 hatte es keinen direkten Briefwechsel zwischen Stalin und Roosevelt gegeben . Erst in 1942.
- Stalin hatte nur einmal ,im October 1941, in Korrespondenz mit Churchill auf Engpaesse hingewiesen.
J. V. STALIN TO W. CHURCHILL*
My dear Prime Minister Churchill,
The arrival of the British and American Missions in Moscow
and particularly the fact that they were led by Lord Beaverbrook
and Mr Harriman, had ia most favourable effect. As for Lord
Beaverbrook, he did his utmost to expedite consideration and,
possibly, solution of the most pressing problems discussed at the
Moscow Tripartite Conference9 and to make tbepi fruitful. I can
say the same for Mr Harriman. I wish therefore to convey to you
and Mr Roosevelt the sincere gratitude of the Soviet Government
for sending such authoritative representatives to Moscow.
I admit that our present requirements in military supplies, arising
from a number of unfavourable circumstances on our front
and the resulting evacuation of a further group of enterprises, to
say nothing of the feet that a number of issues have been put off
until final consideration and settlement in London and Washington,
transcend the decisions agreed at the conference. Nevertheless,
the Moscow Conference did a great deal of important work. I
hope the British and American Governments will do all they can
to increase the monthly quotas and also to -seize the slightest opportunity
to accelerate the planned deliveries right now, since
the Hitlerites will use the pre-winter months to exert the utmost
pressure on the U.S.S.R.
With regard to both Turkey and China I agree with the considerations
you have stated. I hope the British Government is displaying
the proper activity at the moment in both directions,
because this is particularly important now that the U.S.S.R.'s
opportunities are naturally limited.
As regards the prospects of our common struggle against the
bandits* lair of Hitlerites, who have entrenched themselves in
the heart of Europe, I am confident that despite the difficulties
we shall secure the defeat of Hitler in the interest of our freedomloving
peoples.
Yours sincerely,
J. STALIN
October 3, 1941
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Teil des ersten originalem Protocols vom Okt. 1941 zwischen den U.S.A. und der U.S.S.R. (Nicht zu verwechseln mit dem 'Master Agreement' ) Erst nach diesem Datum , also effektiv in 1942 erhielten die Russkies amerikanisches Kriegszeug dass jedoch erst produziert werden musste (vorher wurden als Art 'good will' Geste schon einige Lieferungen an Russland geliefert.
. 
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Hopkins Papers
The Administrator of Lend-Lease (Stettinius) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)
Washington, December 9, 1941.
Memorandum
Subject: Diversion of Equipment Produced in the United States and Other Strategy Questions.
1.
About $13,000,000,000 has already been appropriated for Lend-Lease purposes. Another $1,500,000,000 will probably be appropriated within the next few days. If we take into account the munitions, ships, etc. which can be transferred under the billion-3,1 the Maritime Commission Act, and the one-half billion of transfers that can be made under the pending bill, it will be a grand total of $17,900,000,000 available for Lend-Lease transfers.
Das Lend-Lease Programm zugunsten hauptsaechlich vier Staaten hatte wesentlich mehr 18 Milliarden Dollars verschlungen.
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