Krisenherd Ukraine (Dez. 2013 - Mai 2023)

[Quo vadis]

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Kann jemand sagen was das für ein Vorfall ist?

[Quo vadis]

Sehr schönes Fundstück.

Schwarz-weiß, grobe Körnung (?). Irgendwie bedeutsam. Stark umgesetzt: die Last der Verantwortung auf Diekmanns Schultern. Er schaut ein bisschen wie Henry Kissinger aus. Übernächtigt, ernst, entschlossen. Wird Poroschenkos Nachfolge geregelt, gab es einen AB-Anruf?

Der schaut vor allem wie ein Voll****t aus.

[KatII]

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Kann jemand sagen was das für ein Vorfall ist?

Der LKW hat Feuerholz transportiert und wurde aus ukr. Richtung beschossen. 2 Donezker tot. Es war ein lenkbares Geschoss, was das gefundene Lenkseil beweist.

[Jodlerkönig]

Der LKW hat Feuerholz transportiert und wurde aus ukr. Richtung beschossen. 2 Donezker tot. Es war ein lenkbares Geschoss, was das gefundene Lenkseil beweist.

sicher eine russische false flag aktion!

[navy]

Alle Probleme in Kiew, der Ukraine kamen vom Westen, sagt der Ex-Präsident der Tschechei, Vaclav Klaus, vor allem weil NGO's wie auch die KAS, hoch kriminell Demonstrationen finanzierten.

"...the pressure came from the West. Russia is not guilty. Russian actions were a reaction", Vaclav Klaus, former Czech President

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Part of channel(s): Ukraine (current event)

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March 8, 2015, Former Czech president Vaclav Klaus doesn't believe Ukraine will remain an integral country after Kiev launched a military operation in the country's southeast that claimed thousands of lives.

The United States, as well as European politicians, has started the Ukrainian conflict, while Russia was forced to react, former president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, told an Austrian newspaper Tiroler Tageszeitung.

"I belong to the minority of politicians, journalists and intellectuals, who believe that the pressure came from the West. From this point of view, Russia is not guilty. Russian actions were, in my opinion, a reaction, a forced move," he said.

According to Klaus, it was the US, who provoked the Ukrainian conflict by financing the Maidan's organization through NGOs. The fact that Maidan lasted so long was not only due to the popularity of the movement, but mostly because it was organized by the West, he notes.

Klaus has also said that the Cold War has already been going on and its price is too high.

Czech ex-president sees no exit from the Ukrainian crisis. Klaus critized Ukrainian authorities because they have not initiated any essential negotiations and are seeking to resolve the conflict by force, including foreign one.

The politician emphasized that Ukraine has always been a "fragile and divided country." Former Czech leader doesn't believe Ukraine will remain being an integral country after "all those victims and destruction."

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[KatII]

sicher eine russische false flag aktion!

Du bist eine False Flag Aktion deiner Mutter.

[Quo vadis]

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[konfutse]

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Selbst wenn das Foto manipuliert ist bleibt es Fakt, dass Klitschko als Marionette Deutschlands Verbrecher und Nazis unterstützt und beschützt.

[Panther]

Entgegen dem Minsker-Abkommens hat das ukrainische Parlament den Sonderstatus der Donbass- Region ohne Einbeziehung der Regierungsgegner festgelegt. Der Staatschef des Landes, Petro Poroschenko, sprach sich derweil auch für eine Militärpräsenz von 1.000 US-Soldaten im Westen des Landes aus.

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Damit ist der Waffenstillstand gebrochen und hinfällig.
Die Kiever Junta könnte ihre Angriffe jederzeit wieder beginnen. Das Wetter ist ja ausgezeichnet.

Die dauerhafte Installierung einer US Militärpräsenz ist eine direkte Kampfansage an Rußland.

[Soshana]

Kann Putin ueberleben ? Aktuelle Stratfor Analyse:

Can Putin Survive?

March 17, 2015

By George Friedman

Editor's Note: This week, we revisit a Geopolitical Weekly first published in July 2014 that explored whether Russian President Vladimir Putin could hold on to power despite his miscalculations in Ukraine, a topic that returned to prominence with his recent temporary absence from public view. While Putin has since reappeared, the issues highlighted by his disappearing act persist.

There is a general view that Vladimir Putin governs the Russian Federation as a dictator, that he has defeated and intimidated his opponents and that he has marshaled a powerful threat to surrounding countries. This is a reasonable view, but perhaps it should be re-evaluated in the context of recent events.
Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia's Decline

Ukraine is, of course, the place to start. The country is vital to Russia as a buffer against the West and as a route for delivering energy to Europe, which is the foundation of the Russian economy. On Jan. 1, Ukraine's president was Viktor Yanukovich, generally regarded as favorably inclined to Russia. Given the complexity of Ukrainian society and politics, it would be unreasonable to say Ukraine under him was merely a Russian puppet. But it is fair to say that under Yanukovich and his supporters, fundamental Russian interests in Ukraine were secure.

This was extremely important to Putin. Part of the reason Putin had replaced Boris Yeltsin in 2000 was Yeltsin's performance during the Kosovo war. Russia was allied with the Serbs and had not wanted NATO to launch a war against Serbia. Russian wishes were disregarded. The Russian views simply didn't matter to the West. Still, when the air war failed to force Belgrade's capitulation, the Russians negotiated a settlement that allowed U.S. and other NATO troops to enter and administer Kosovo. As part of that settlement, Russian troops were promised a significant part in peacekeeping in Kosovo. But the Russians were never allowed to take up that role, and Yeltsin proved unable to respond to the insult.

Putin also replaced Yeltsin because of the disastrous state of the Russian economy. Though Russia had always been poor, there was a pervasive sense that it been a force to be reckoned with in international affairs. Under Yeltsin, however, Russia had become even poorer and was now held in contempt in international affairs. Putin had to deal with both issues. He took a long time before moving to recreate Russian power, though he said early on that the fall of the Soviet Union had been the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. This did not mean he wanted to resurrect the Soviet Union in its failed form, but rather that he wanted Russian power to be taken seriously again, and he wanted to protect and enhance Russian national interests.

The breaking point came in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004. Yanukovich was elected president that year under dubious circumstances, but demonstrators forced him to submit to a second election. He lost, and a pro-Western government took office. At that time, Putin accused the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies of having organized the demonstrations. Fairly publicly, this was the point when Putin became convinced that the West intended to destroy the Russian Federation, sending it the way of the Soviet Union. For him, Ukraine's importance to Russia was self-evident. He therefore believed that the CIA organized the demonstration to put Russia in a dangerous position, and that the only reason for this was the overarching desire to cripple or destroy Russia. Following the Kosovo affair, Putin publicly moved from suspicion to hostility to the West.

The Russians worked from 2004 to 2010 to undo the Orange Revolution. They worked to rebuild the Russian military, focus their intelligence apparatus and use whatever economic influence they had to reshape their relationship with Ukraine. If they couldn't control Ukraine, they did not want it to be controlled by the United States and Europe. This was, of course, not their only international interest, but it was the pivotal one.

Russia's invasion of Georgia had more to do with Ukraine than it had to do with the Caucasus. At the time, the United States was still bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Washington had no formal obligation to Georgia, there were close ties and implicit guarantees. The invasion of Georgia was designed to do two things. The first was to show the region that the Russian military, which had been in shambles in 2000, was able to act decisively in 2008. The second was to demonstrate to the region, and particularly to Kiev, that American guarantees, explicit or implicit, had no value. In 2010, Yanukovich was elected president of Ukraine, reversing the Orange Revolution and limiting Western influence in the country.

Recognizing the rift that was developing with Russia and the general trend against the United States in the region, the Obama administration tried to recreate older models of relationships when Hillary Clinton presented Putin with a "reset" button in 2009. But Washington wanted to restore the relationship in place during what Putin regarded as the "bad old days." He naturally had no interest in such a reset. Instead, he saw the United States as having adopted a defensive posture, and he intended to exploit his advantage.

One place he did so was in Europe, using EU dependence on Russian energy to grow closer to the Continent, particularly Germany. But his high point came during the Syrian affair, when the Obama administration threatened airstrikes after Damascus used chemical weapons only to back off from its threat. The Russians aggressively opposed Obama's move, proposing a process of negotiations instead. The Russians emerged from the crisis appearing decisive and capable, the United States indecisive and feckless. Russian power accordingly appeared on the rise, and in spite of a weakening economy, this boosted Putin's standing.
The Tide Turns Against Putin

Events in Ukraine this year, by contrast, have proved devastating to Putin. In January, Russia dominated Ukraine. By February, Yanukovich had fled the country and a pro-Western government had taken power. The general uprising against Kiev that Putin had been expecting in eastern Ukraine after Yanukovich's ouster never happened. Meanwhile, the Kiev government, with Western advisers, implanted itself more firmly. By July, the Russians controlled only small parts of Ukraine. These included Crimea, where the Russians had always held overwhelming military force by virtue of treaty, and a triangle of territory from Donetsk to Luhansk to Severodonetsk, where a small number of insurgents apparently supported by Russian special operations forces controlled a dozen or so towns.
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