MOSSAD NATO Alphabet Stations (E10)
High Traffic ART EZI FTJ JSR KPA PCD SYN ULX VLB YHF
Low Traffic CIO MIW
Non Traffic ABC BAY FDU GBZ HNC NDP OEM ROV TMS ZWL
Transmission times----CIO h+45 KPA h+15 MIW h+15 SYN h+45 VLB h+45.
1735 2120 2515 2540 2953 3090 3270 3485 3640 4165 4360 4665 4780 5170 5230 5380 5435 5530 5629 6370 6658 6745 6930 6986 7445 7605 7613 7690 7811 8025 8127 8465 8641 8805 9270 9382 10125 10352 10820 10970 12376 12747 12950 13190 13921 14000 14750 14866 15016 17170 17966 18177.
"VLB" - repeated for about three minutes
1) "Message, message"
2. "Group 34, group 34
3. "Text, text"
4. "APKNC BNVGT OLIUY GFDVP...."
5. "End of message
"Repeat, repeat"
(Items 1 through 5 then repeated once more)
6. "End of transmission"
"CIOTlBlBl4ZlIZ55 decodes to 1, 1, 14, 11 and 55
The MOSSAD stations provided some useful base line signals as they are assumed to be transmitted from Israel. Sure enough, all day round, no matter what the frequency, EZI, YHF, CIO and co. provided MASSIVE signals. As an illustration, the midday EZI transmission on 17410 and 19715 kHz are pretty poorly received in the UK. Over at the holiday QTH, these signals were very strong with just a foot of the set's internal whip antenna extended!. So strong in fact, that the mains hum on the transmitter could be heard. * Could this suggest possible ground wave from Cyprus ?
1) High traffic stations Day to day operations ?
2) Low traffic stations General alert transmissions ?
3) Non traffic stations Deep cover/mission specific ?
Lets look at each type and its particular habits.
1) High traffic stations - These are perhaps the ones you hear most often and follow the standard message operating format described in the example of VLB at the start of our feature. Stations of this type have a regular schedule and follow predictable time lines.
Type one stations are ART EZI FTJ JSR KPA PCD SYN ULX VLB& YHF ( & the now defunct GPO )
2) Low traffic stations - These stations do not send regular standard messages but do still maintain a regular schedule. These appear to have a different purpose to type 1 stations.
Type two stations are CIO & MIW
3) Non traffic stations. These stations are somewhat more difficult to pin down and do not seem to send any standard traffic messages. They also do not appear to have a set schedule and finding them is more a matter of luck than of judgement.
Type 3 stations are BAY GBZ OEM NDP TMS ZWL ROV and HNC
Having now identified the 3 types of station it is possible to move onto traffic analysis. This is perhaps the most enlightening part of the mystery. Type 1 stations are the 'bread & butter' of the communications system, sending out a seemingly endless number of rota style messages. It is not possible to ascertain whether traffic is sent for individuals or groups but messages do stay on the system for a period of time and would appear to be repeated until such time that HQ is satisfied that they have been received.
Type 2 stations do not send regular traffic and are prone to long periods of idling followed by bursts of activity The purpose of CIO and its sister station MIW are of course unknown but monitoring would suggest that these two stations arc some type of general alert system and may serve to communicate more blanket information in the of both traffic messages and special message strings Certainly in the case of both callsigns, when traffic does occur it is not unknown for a single message to be transmitted continuously for 24 hours per day non-stop.
Type 3 stations are perhaps even more incomprehensible in nature and could best be described as inverted version of type 1 stations. Type 3 stations have never been heard to send traffic messages. Moreover they appear without warning arid send peculiar message strings consisting of additional letters and numbers added to a repeating call sign before disappearing into the wilderness until discovered again by a bit of chance tuning. Just before we move on to message strings, it may well be worth writing a few lines about the phonetic code system. Some time ago we received a report that the system used was called Aroflex, a crypto system of 5 Letter groups developed by Siemens for NATO wide use. Any further information on this would be appreciated.
It would seem unlikely that all field agents decrypt their messages by hand and some in less sensitive situations would probably use equipment similar to the Gretacoder DH-26 hand held .encryption unit. The equipment's algorithm assures maximum security with 10 to the power of 52 user selected code combinations. It is of course the case that any agent found with such equipment in their possession would be presumed guilty of clandestine activity. Such equipment uses the triple key principle An elementary key is the first secret element and is periodically changed by the user himself.
Das recording kann leider nur als zip mit. (Ist .wav format)
Ich habe 32 recordings bekommen, dieses seit nur einen Jahr. Wie aktive sind die 'Dienste' innerhalb der EU und EU Mitgliedstaat gegen EU Mitgliedstaat? Kann man sich nur wundern wenn man etwas von Kurzwelle versteht und einen guten Empfaenger hat!!