Zitat:
I’m currently at the Russian Khmeimim airbase, where I was able to talk to Russian servicemen about their attitude to what is happening in Syria.
Initially, the militants didn’t know what they could achieve.
"The attack began early in the morning of November 27. Its goal was to regain control over sections of the M5 highway in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Hama, lost during the government offensive in 2018.
The HTS mercenaries were in the lead. Those we call the opposition, or SNA, were in no hurry to join the battle.
When it became clear that the defense of the SAA was unstable, the militants continued the offensive to encircle Aleppo from the south- and north-west, trying to capture the crossroads. And then it turned out that government troops simply fled from Aleppo. And the militants went further.
I would like to emphasize that from the very beginning of the militants' offensive, entire brigades of the SAA abandoned their positions and fled without a fight.
Individual units, such as the Tigers Forces, resisted. But combat-ready units were distributed along the front line mixed with less combat-ready units, primarily those morally less combat-ready. Accordingly, the resistance was focal and some were forced to retreat due to the withdrawal of their neighbors, while the militants concentrated attack drones (including ukrainian-made ones) and artillery on others.
The problem of the government army was a very serious shortage of rocket artillery, assault army aviation, as well as self-propelled artillery units and electronic warfare equipment. The advancing militants are equipped with armored vehicles, including tanks, they are supported by howitzers, grenade launchers, mobile mortar batteries and self-propelled guns supplied to the HTS through the SNA by the Turkish side.
The RuAF and the SAF could thin out the advancing lines of the militants, but without the proper level of artillery support, this could not turn the tide of the offensive. Or they needed many more aircraft.
For me, it was more interesting to know what preceded the collapse of the defense:
In 2018, Russia proposed to the Syrian government to reform the armed forces. We offered to supply new equipment on credit. It could be repaid at the expense of our companies if they were given preferential terms in Syria.
Now we are conducting a Special Military Operation. But if Syria had taken our weapons and equipment back then, they would have stayed with their army and helped repel the militants. Provided that we taught them how to use it.
But then the Syrian leadership refused. Maybe they considered it unprofitable, I don’t know.
Our advisers could only train Syrian soldiers to shoot and operate drones. But you can’t change such an army.
Meanwhile, the Turks and other NATO members were turning the militants into something resembling a real army.
At the same time, all the combat commanders who fought with us were removed from their command posts in the Syrian army. The well-known units that we helped were disbanded. Over the past year, new commanders were appointed in all divisions and brigades near Aleppo, Idlib and Hama. They eventually fled along with their soldiers.
As for Iran, the US and israel didn’t allow them to transfer troops and equipment. The same can be said about Hezbollah.
My comrades and I don’t know what the politicians will decide. I think it would be right to come to an agreement with the new government and leave our bases. After all, we signed the Astana agreements with the opposition. This means that we can negotiate. It’s unlikely that our leadership will want to be just occupiers, like the Americans. Assad signed an agreement with us on bases.
Whether they will leave him now - we will see. As for our friends, some of them, as far as I know, are already in Russia. The thing is that many of those who worked with us won’t come to us.
But people who don’t want to live in Syria now - many of them are thinking of leaving for Russia.
I hope our government will help them."
